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A credit rating agency (CRA) is a company that assigns credit ratings for issuers of certain types of debt obligations. In most cases, these issuers are companies, cities, non-profit organizations, or national governments issuing debt-like securities that can be traded on a secondary market. A credit rating measures credit worthiness, the ability to pay back a loan, and affects the interest rate applied to loans. (A company that issues credit scores for individual credit-worthiness is generally called a credit bureau or consumer credit reporting agency.)
Interest rates are not the same for everyone, but instead are based on risk-based pricing, a form of price discrimination based on the different expected costs of different borrowers, as set out in their credit rating. There exist more than 100 rating agencies worldwide.
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For more information, see Bond credit rating.
Agencies that assign credit ratings for corporations include:
Credit ratings are used by investors, issuers, investment banks, broker-dealers, and by governments. For investors, credit rating agencies increase the range of investment alternatives and provide independent, easy-to-use measurements of relative credit risk; this generally increases the efficiency of the market, lowering costs for both borrowers and lenders. This in turn increases the total supply of risk capital in the economy, leading to stronger growth. It also opens the capital markets to categories of borrower who might otherwise be shut out altogether: small governments, startup companies, hospitals and universities.
Ratings use by bond issuers
Issuers rely on credit ratings as an independent verification of their own credit-worthiness. In most cases, a significant bond issuance must have at least one rating from a respected CRA for the issuance to be successful (without such a rating, the issuance may be undersubscribed or the price offered by investors too low for the issuer\'s purposes). Recent studies by the Bond Market Association note that many institutional investors now prefer that a debt issuance have at least three ratings. Issuers also use credit ratings in certain structured finance transactions. For example, a company with a very high credit rating wishing to undertake a particularly risky research project could create a legally separate entity with certain assets that would own and conduct the research work. This "special purpose entity" would then assume all of the research risk and issue its own debt securities to finance the research. The SPE\'s credit rating likely would be very low and the issuer would have to pay a high rate of return on the bonds issued. However, this risk would not lower the parent company\'s overall credit rating because the SPE would be a legally separate entity. Conversely, a company with a low credit rating might be able to borrow on better terms if it were to form an SPE and transfer significant assets to that subsidiary and issue secured debt securities. That way, if the venture were to fail, the lenders would have recourse to the assets owned by the SPE. This would lower the interest rate the SPE would need to pay as part of the debt offering.
The same issuer also may have different credit ratings for different bonds. This difference results from the bond\'s structure, how it is secured, and the degree to which the bond is subordinated to other debt. Many larger CRAs offer "credit rating advisory services" that essentially advise an issuer on how to structure its bond offerings and SPEs so as to achieve a given credit rating for a certain debt tranche. This creates a potential conflict of interest, of course, as the CRA may feel obligated to provide the issuer with that given rating if the issuer followed its advice on structuring the offering. Some CRAs avoid this conflict by refusing to rate debt offerings for which its advisory services were sought.
Ratings use by investment banks and broker-dealers
Investment banks and broker-dealers also use credit ratings in calculating their own risk portfolios (i.e., the collective risk of all of their investments). Larger banks and broker-dealers conduct their own risk calculations, but rely on CRA ratings as a "check" (and double-check or triple-check) against their own analyses.
Ratings use by government regulators
Regulators use credit ratings as well, or permit these ratings to be used for regulatory purposes. For example, under the Basel II agreement of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banking regulators can allow banks to use credit ratings from certain approved CRAs (called "ECAIs" or "External Credit Assessment Institutions") when calculating their net capital reserve requirements. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits investment banks and broker-dealers to use credit ratings from "Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations" (or "NRSROs") for similar purposes. The idea is that banks and other financial institutions should not need to keep in reserve the same amount of capital to protect the institution against (for example) a run on the bank, if the financial institution is heavily invested in highly liquid and very "safe" securities (such as U.S. government bonds or short-term commercial paper from very stable companies).
CRA ratings are also used for other regulatory purposes as well. The U.S. SEC, for example, permits certain bond issuers to use a shortened prospectus form when issuing bonds if the issuer is older, has issued bonds before, and has a credit rating above a certain level. SEC regulations also require that money market funds (mutual funds that mimic the safety and liquidity of a bank savings deposit, but without FDIC insurance) comprise only securities with a very high rating from an NRSRO. Likewise, insurance regulators use credit ratings to ascertain the strength of the reserves held by insurance companies.
It is important to note that under both Basel II and SEC regulations, not just any CRA\'s ratings can be used for regulatory purposes. (If this were the case, it would present an obvious moral hazard, since an issuer, insurance company, or investment bank would have a strong incentive to seek out a CRA with the most lax standards, with potentially dire consequences for overall financial stability.) Rather, there is a vetting process, of varying sorts. The Basel II guidelines (paragraph 91, et al), for example, describe certain criteria that bank regulators should look to when permitting the ratings from a particular CRA to be used. These include "objectivity," "independence," "transparency," and others. Banking regulators from a number of jurisdictions have since issued their own discussion papers on this subject, to further define how these terms will be used in practice. (See The Committee of European Banking Supervisors Discussion Paper, or the State Bank of Pakistan ECAI Criteria.)
In the United States, since 1975, NRSRO recognition has been granted through a "No Action Letter" sent by the SEC staff. Following this approach, if a CRA (or investment bank or broker-dealer) were interested in using the ratings from a particular CRA for regulatory purposes, the SEC staff would research the market to determine whether ratings from that particular CRA are widely used and considered "reliable and credible." If the SEC staff determines that this is the case, it sends a letter to the CRA indicating that if a regulated entity were to rely on the CRA\'s ratings, the SEC staff will not recommend enforcement action against that entity. These "No Action" letters are made public and can be relied upon by other regulated entities, not just the entity making the original request. The SEC has since sought to further define the criteria it uses when making this assessment, and in March 2005 published a proposed regulation to this effect.
On September 29, 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush signed into law the "Rating Reform Act of 2006". This law requires the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to clarify how NRSRO recognition is granted, eliminates the "No Action Letter" approach and makes NRSRO recognition a Commission (rather than SEC staff) decision, and requires NRSROs to register with, and be regulated by, the SEC. On Feb. 2, 2007, the SEC proposed a rule on "Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations" that would implement the CRA Reform Act.
Recognizing their role in capital formation, some governments have attempted to jumpstart their domestic rating-agency businesses with various kinds of regulatory relief or encouragement. This may, however, be counterproductive, if it dulls the market mechanism by which agencies compete, subsidizing less-capable agencies and penalizing agencies that devote resources to higher-quality opinions.
Ratings use in structured finance
Credit rating agencies may also play a key role in structured financial transactions. Unlike a "typical" loan or bond issuance, where a borrower offers to pay a certain return on a loan, structured financial transactions may be viewed as either a series of loans with different characteristics, or else a number of small loans of a similar type packaged together into a series of "buckets" (with the "buckets" or different loans called "tranches"). Credit ratings often determine the interest rate or price ascribed to a particular tranche, based on the quality of loans or quality of assets contained within that grouping.
Companies involved in structured financing arrangements often consult with credit rating agencies to help them determine how to structure the individual tranches so that each receives a desired credit rating. For example, a firm may wish to borrow a large sum of money by issuing debt securities. However, the amount is so large that the return investors may demand on a single issuance would be prohibitive. Instead, it decides to issue three separate bonds, with three separate credit ratings -- A (medium low risk), BBB (medium risk), and BB (speculative) (using Standard & Poor\'s rating system). The firm expects that the effective interest rate it pays on the A-rated bonds will be much less than the rate it must pay on the BB-rated bonds, but that, overall, the amount it must pay for the total capital it raises will be less than it would pay if the entire amount were raised from a single bond offering. As this transaction is devised, the firm may consult with a credit rating agency to see how it must structure each tranche -- in other words, what types of assets must be used to secure the debt in each tranche -- in order for that tranche to receive the desired rating when it is issued.
Currently, there is some debate, particularly in France, about whether such consulting arrangements by credit rating agencies constitute a conflict of interest. Under this view, if a CRA has offered its consulting services in structuring such a financial arrangement (for which it charges a fee), that CRA may feel obligated to give each debt tranche the credit rating it suggested would result from their advice. Such criticism has intensified in the wake of large losses in the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market that occurred despite being assigned top ratings by the CRAs. For instance, losses on $340.7 million worth of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) issued by Credit Suisse Group added up to about $125 million, despite being rated AAA or Aaa by Standard & Poor\'s, Moody\'s Investors Service and Fitch Group.Tomlinson, Richard & Evans, David (2007-06-01), "CDOs mask huge subprime losses, abetted by credit rating agencies", International Herald Tribune, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/31/bloomberg/bxinvest.php>
The rating agencies respond that their advice constitutes only a "point in time" analysis, that they make clear that they never promise or guarantee a certain rating to a tranche, and that they also make clear that any change in circumstance regarding the risk factors of a particular tranche will invalidate their analysis and result in a different credit rating. In addition, some CRAs do not rate bond issuances upon which they have offered such advice.
Complicating matters, particularly where structured finance transactions are concerned, the rating agencies state that their ratings are opinions regarding the likelihood that a given debt security will fail to be serviced over a given period of time, and not an opinion on the volatility of that security and certainly not the wisdom of investing in that security. In the past, most highly rated (AAA or Aaa) debt securities were characterized low volatility and high liquidity -- in other words, the price of a highly rated bond did not fluctuate greatly day-to-day, and sellers of such securities could easily find buyers. However, where structured transactions that involve the bundling of hundreds or thousands of similar (and similarly rated) securities tend to concentrate similar risk in such a way that even a slight change on a chance of default can have an enormous effect on the price of the bundled security. This means that even though a rating agency could be correct in its opinion that the chance of default of a structured product is very low, even a slight change in the market\'s perception of the risk of that product can have a disproportionate effect on the product\'s market price, with the result that an ostensibly AAA or Aaa-rated security can collapse in price even without there being any default (or significant chance of default). This possibility raises significant regulatory issues because the use of ratings in securities and banking regulation (as noted above) assumes that high ratings correspond with low volatility and high liquidity.
Credit rating agencies have been subject to the following criticisms:
| last = Borrus | first = Amy | author-link = | last2 = | first2 = | author2-link = | title = The Credit-Raters: How They Work and How They Might Work Better | newspaper = BusinessWeek | pages = | year = 2002 | date = 2002-04-08 | url = http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_14/b3777054.htmWyatt, Edward (2002-02-08), Credit Agencies Waited Months to Voice Doubt About Enron, <http://bodurtha.georgetown.edu/enron/Credit%20Agencies%20Waited%20Months%20to%20Voice%20Doubt%20About%20Enron.htm> Some finance scholars[citation needed] have documented in empirical studies that yield spreads of corporate bonds start to expand as credit quality deteriorates but before a rating downgrade, implying that the market often leads a downgrade and questioning the informational value of credit ratings. This has led to suggestions that, rather than rely on CRA ratings in financial regulation, financial regulators should instead require banks, broker-dealers and insurance firms (among others) to use credit spreads when calculating the risk in their portfolio.
, because barriers to market entry are high and rating agency business is itself reputation-based (and the finance industry pays little attention to a rating that is not widely recognized). Of the large agencies, only Moody\'s is a separate, publicly held corporation that discloses its financial results without dilution by non-ratings businesses. The high profit on Moody\'s revenues (>50% gross margin), which are consistent with the high barriers to entry, do nothing to allay market fears of monopoly pricing.
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10113339
As part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress ordered the U.S. SEC to develop a report, titled Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Marketsdetailing how credit ratings are used in U.S. regulation and the policy issues this use raises. Partly as a result of this report, in June 2003, the SEC published a "concept release" called Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal Securities Laws that sought public comment on many of the issues raised in its report. Public commentson this concept release have also been published on the SEC\'s website.
In December 2004, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a Code of Conduct for CRAs that, among other things, is designed to address the types of conflicts of interest that CRAs face. All of the major CRAs have agreed to sign on to this Code of Conduct and it has been praised by regulators ranging from the European Commission to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
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